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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) recently 
declared that the Commonwealth’s statutory ban on stun guns 
violates the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  The 
SJC had previously upheld the statute against constitutional 
challenge in Commonwealth v. Caetano, but the reasoning behind 
this holding was rejected in a brief per curium opinion by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 2016.  However, the guidance given by the 
Supreme Court in the Caetano litigation was far from 
unambiguous: it faulted the SJC’s reasoning without opining on 
the ultimate question of the ban’s constitutionality, thus leaving 
open the possibility that the statute could pass constitutional 
muster under an alternative analytic approach.  This essay 
discusses what such an alternative approach might have looked 
like.  Specifically, I suggest that the SJC could have upheld the 
statutory ban by emphasizing the relative rarity of stun guns as a 
preferred means of self-defense not only as a matter of founding 
era history, but also as a matter of contemporary reality.  This sort 
of analysis would have allowed the SJC to distinguish stun guns 
from other weapons that have received constitutional protection in 
other cases, and would have been fully consistent with both the 
scope and limitations of the right to bear arms under the Supreme 
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I. Introduction 
In Ramirez v. Commonwealth,1 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court (“SJC”) declared that the Commonwealth’s 
statutory ban on stun guns violates the Second Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.2 The SJC had previously upheld the 
statute against constitutional challenge in Commonwealth v. 
Caetano,3 but the reasoning behind this holding was rejected by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in a brief per curiam opinion in 2016.4 
Notably, while the Supreme Court found that the SJC’s analysis 
in Caetano I was inconsistent with constitutional principles, it 
did not go so far as to hold the Massachusetts stun gun ban 
unconstitutional; it merely vacated the Caetano I judgment and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.5 Nevertheless, the 
SJC has interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance to mean that 
“the absolute prohibition in section 131J that bars all civilians 
from possessing or carrying stun guns, even in their home, is 
inconsistent with the Second Amendment and is therefore 
unconstitutional.”6 
Yet the SJC may have been too hasty in reaching this 
conclusion. For the Supreme Court’s “guidance” in Caetano II was 
                                                                                                     
 1. 94 N.E.3d 809 (Mass. 2018) (striking down MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 
131J (2004) as facially invalid). 
 2. Id.  
 3. 26 N.E.3d 668 (Mass. 2015) (hereinafter “Caetano I”), vacated, Caetano 
v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016). 
 4. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (hereinafter “Caetano 
II”).  
 5. Id.  
 6. Ramirez, 94 N.E.3d at 815. 
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far from unambiguous: it faulted the SJC’s reasoning without 
opining on the ultimate question of constitutionality, thus leaving 
open the possibility that section 131J could pass constitutional 
muster under an alternative analytic approach. This essay 
discusses what such an alternative approach might have looked 
like and assesses how it might have fared. Specifically, I suggest 
that the SJC could have upheld section 131J by emphasizing the 
relative rarity of stun guns as a preferred means of self-defense 
not only as a matter of founding era history but also as a matter 
of contemporary reality.  I argue that this sort of analysis would 
have allowed the SJC to distinguish stun guns from other 
weapons that have received constitutional protection in other 
cases,7 and would have been fully consistent with both the scope 
and limitations of the right to bear arms under the Supreme 
Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
II. Second Amendment Doctrine: Tensions and Ambiguities 
Beginning with United States v. Miller8 in 1939, federal 
courts long took the view that the Second Amendment “protects 
the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, 
but . . . does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the 
nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”9 Indeed, until 2001, 
“every Court of Appeals to consider the question had understood 
Miller to hold that the Second Amendment does not protect the 
right to possess and use guns for purely private, civilian 
purposes.”10 But since District of Columbia v. Heller11 in 2008, the 
                                                                                                     
 7. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (concluding 
that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms not 
connected to service in militia, and striking down D.C.’s ban on possession of 
handguns and requirement that other firearms be disassembled or bound by 
trigger lock); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S 742 (2010) (determining that the 
Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
and striking down municipal ban on private ownership of handguns). 
 8. 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to 
conviction under the National Firearms Act for transporting short-barreled 
shotgun in interstate commerce). 
 9. Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 638 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 11. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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Supreme Court has articulated a much more expansive 
understanding of the right to bear arms. The Second Amendment 
is no longer limited to militia service or to those weapons that are 
useful in warfare; it is now interpreted to confer an individual 
right that encompasses “all instruments that constitute bearable 
arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the 
founding.”12 
The Court’s per curiam opinion in Caetano II chided the SJC 
for failing to adequately account for the breadth of current 
Second Amendment doctrine. The SJC had reasoned that section 
131J was constitutional because stun guns “were not in common 
use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,”13 were 
unusual in the sense of being “a thoroughly modern invention,”14 
and were not “readily adaptable to use in the military.”15 But the 
Supreme Court found that these reasons were inconsistent with 
Heller’s conclusion that the right to bear arms was not limited to 
military arms or to weapons in existence in the 18th century.16 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion sharpened this criticism, noting 
that the SJC “did not so much as mention” Heller’s language 
interpreting the Second Amendment to include arms “not in 
existence at the time of the founding.”17 The Court accordingly 
vacated the SJC’s decision, insofar as “the explanation the 
Massachusetts court offered for upholding the law contradicts 
this Court’s precedent.”18 
But if the SJC’s opinion in Caetano I did not adequately 
engage with the Second Amendment’s breadth, the Supreme 
Court’s opinion surely did not adequately engage with the 
Amendment’s limitations. Heller itself explicitly stated that “the 
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited,” and 
that “the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose.”19 The Heller majority went on to “recognize another 
                                                                                                     
 12. Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1027 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582). 
 13. Caetano I, 26 N.E.3d at 693.  
 14. Id. at 693–94. 
 15. Id. at 694. 
 16. Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1028. 
 17. Id. at 1030 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582). 
 18. Id. at 1028. 
 19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
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important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms”—
namely, that “the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in 
common use at the time’” of the founding.20 The Court observed 
that this limitation was “fairly supported by the historical 
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual 
weapons.’”21 This language is clearly relevant to any 
constitutional assessments of bans on newer weapons such as 
stun guns.22 This language is also clearly in tension with any 
suggestion that stun guns are obviously and categorically 
protected by the Second Amendment. Yet the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Caetano II barely mentioned these important 
limitations on the right to bear arms and offered no discussion of 
how to resolve the tensions inherent in its own Second 
Amendment jurisprudence. As noted above, the Court did not 
even clearly state that section 131J was necessarily 
unconstitutional—it simply rejected the SJC’s reasoning and left 
the doctrinal landscape in a state of ambiguity. 
III. Resolving the Ambiguity: An Alternative Approach  
So how was the SJC to resolve this ambiguity? One option 
was the approach actually taken by the court in Ramirez—i.e., to 
read the Supreme Court’s opinion in Caetano II to mean that an 
absolute ban on civilian possession of stun guns is 
unconstitutional.23  But that approach is unsatisfactory for 
several reasons. First, it fails to adequately account for the fact 
that the Supreme Court did not itself strike down the stun gun 
ban when it was presented with the opportunity to do so.24  
Second, the SJC’s approach would seem to assume that many of 
the limits on the right to bear arms expressly recognized in Heller 
                                                                                                     
 20. Id. at 627. 
 21. Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49). 
 22. One might even say that “[i]t is hard to imagine language speaking 
more directly to the point.” Cf. Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1030 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 23. See Ramirez, 94 N.E.3d at 815 (“But the absolute prohibition in § 131J 
that bars all civilians from possessing or carrying stun guns, even in their home, 
is inconsistent with the Second Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional.”). 
 24. See Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1028 (vacating the SJC’s judgment but not 
striking down Massachusetts’ stun gun law). 
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are without practical import. No tribunal should make such an 
assumption in the absence of direct and unambiguous ruling to 
that effect from the Supreme Court—and no such ruling was 
reached in Caetano II. 
A better option would have been for the SJC to avail itself of 
the Supreme Court’s implicit invitation to offer an alternative 
explanation for upholding section 131J against constitutional 
challenge. Rather than emphasizing the fact that stun guns were 
not in common use at the time of the founding, an alternative 
explanation could have emphasized that stun guns are not in 
common use even today—at least not compared to the kinds of 
weapons that have heretofore been the subject of the Supreme 
Court’s Second Amendment solicitousness.25 For example, the 
majority opinion in Heller repeatedly emphasized the prevalence 
of handguns in American society.26 Handguns were said to be the 
“class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American 
society” for self-defense, and are “the most preferred firearm in 
the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s home and 
family.”27   The majority in McDonald v. Chicago28 reiterated 
these points, noting that “the American people have considered 
the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.”29 
Statistics seem to bear out these observations: recent reports 
estimate that there are in excess of 110 million handguns in 
America.30 By comparison, there may be no more than 
                                                                                                     
 25. See id. (rejecting the SJC’s explanation that stun guns were not 
constitutionally protected “because they were not in common use at the time of 
the Second Amendment’s enactment.”). 
 26. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) 
(“[H]andguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense 
in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”). 
 27. See id. at 628 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).  
 29. Id. at 767 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). 
 30. See Tom McCarthy, Lois Beckett & Jessica Glenza, America’s Passion 
for Guns: Ownership and Violence by the Numbers, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2017, 
2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/02/us-gun-control-
ownership- violence-statistics (last visited June 20, 2018) (estimating that there 
were some111 million handguns in U.S. as of 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Harry Enten, There’s a Gun for Every American. 
But Less Than a Third Own Guns, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 15, 2018, 6:02 p.m.), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/15/politics/guns-dont-know-how-many-
america/index.html (last visited June 20, 2018) (discussing surveys about gun 
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approximately 200,000 stun guns owned by private citizens 
nationwide.31 
If the SJC had based its reconsideration of section 131J in 
Ramirez on this contemporary disparity, it would have been 
grounding its discussion firmly in Heller’s core areas of concern 
while simultaneously avoiding the analytic pitfalls identified by 
the Supreme Court in Caetano II. To wit, this sort of analysis 
would have acknowledged that Heller and McDonald create 
rights to bear arms that extend beyond weapons that were in 
existence at the time of the founding, and which include 
overwhelmingly common firearms such as modern handguns. At 
the same time, the analysis would have been true to Heller’s clear 
statement that prohibitions on dangerous and unusual weapons 
are well-established in the constitutional tradition. Given that 
handguns outnumber stun guns in America today by a ratio of at 
least 550 to 1, it would be far from unreasonable to find stun guns 
“unusual” in a constitutionally relevant sense. 
But would this alternative analysis have withstood further 
scrutiny by the Supreme Court? After all, the SJC did already 
mention the numerical disparity between stun guns and firearms 
in its initial opinion in Caetano I.32 However, the SJC’s discussion 
on this point was extremely brief,33 and it was offered in 
connection with the argument that stun guns were unusual at 
the time the Second Amendment was enacted. Contemporary 
rarity was not framed or presented as an independent basis for 
upholding section 131J, nor was it rejected or even addressed by 
the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court. And while Justice 
Alito wrote separately to express the view that stun guns were 
sufficiently popular by today’s standards to merit constitutional 
protection, he was joined on this point by Justice Thomas alone.34 
The fact that a majority of the Court declined to adopt Justice 
                                                                                                     
ownership in the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 31. Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1033. 
 32. See Caetano I, 26 N.E.3d at 693 (“In her motion to dismiss the 
complaint against her, the defendant acknowledged that the ‘number of Tasers 
and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of firearms.’”). 
 33. See Caetano II, 136 S. Ct. at 1032 (characterizing the SJC’s discussion 
on this point as “cursory”). 
 34. Id. at 1032–33. 
SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT STUN GUNS 457 
Alito’s reasoning strongly suggests that an argument rooted in 
the modern scarcity of such weapons remains constitutionally 
viable even after Caetano II. The SJC should have taken the 
opportunity to develop such an argument in greater detail and to 
offer it as a basis for upholding section 131J in Ramirez.  
IV. Conclusion 
Justice Alito declared in his concurring opinion in Caetano II 
that “[a] State’s most basic responsibility is to keep its people 
safe.”35 The state legislature of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts has sought to keep its people safe by limiting 
access to dangerous weapons, including stun guns. Indeed, as 
highlighted by the SJC in Ramirez, “[t]he legislature was so 
concerned with the risk of [stun gun] misuse that, in 1986 it 
initially barred all individuals, including law enforcement 
officers, from possessing electrical weapons.”36 The Supreme 
Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence has imposed 
significant constraints on the ability of states to pursue such 
safety measures. However, other courts should not interpret 
these constraints more broadly than controlling precedent 
requires, nor should courts fail to recognize that these constraints 
themselves are limited in scope. 
To suggest that the SJC should have upheld section 131J in 
Ramirez is not to suggest that it should have been obtuse or 
recalcitrant in the face of clear direction from the Supreme Court. 
Quite to the contrary, this essay has argued that the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence has been replete with tensions and 
ambiguities of the Supreme Court’s own creation. It is not 
incumbent on the SJC or other courts to resolve these tensions by 
reading some of the most important limitations on the right to 
bear arms out of the Second Amendment altogether. In the 
absence of significantly clearer direction from the Supreme Court 
to the contrary, the SJC ought to have upheld the 
constitutionality of section 131J—for such a decision would have 
                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 1033. 
 36. Ramirez, 94 N.E.3d at 817. 
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been fully consistent not only with Supreme Court precedent, but 
also with principles of democratic governance and public safety. 
